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THE DISTORTED ADVERSARIAL POSTURE OF TITLE VII
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CHALLENGES
The recent Supreme Court decision in United Steelworkers v.
Weber,1 upheld the lawfulness under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 2 of private, voluntary, race-conscious "affirmative action
plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories." 3 The Court did not decide,
however, what constitutes a "permissible" affirmative action plan; 4
nor did it consider the lawfulness of affirmative action in public
employment,5 court-ordered affirmative action, affirmative action
instituted via consent decrees,7 or affirmative action taken to comply
with federal administrative agencies' guidelines issued under Execu-
tive Order 11,246 8 or the guidelines of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.9 Moreover, there was sharp disagree-
1443 U.S. 193 (1979).
242 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976, Supp. I 1977 & Supp. H 1978).
3443 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted).
4 "We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between per-
missible and impermissible affirmative action plans." Id. 208.
5 The majority opinion in Weber makes it clear that the Court limited its
holding to the lawfulness of certain affirmative action plans in private industry:
"We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the Kaiser-USWA plan for the
Gramercy plant falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private
sector . . . ." Id. 209. Notwithstanding this caveat, the Sixth Circuit recently
relied on Weber to uphold a race-conscious affirmative action plan for city police
officers. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3558-59 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080).
Additionally, the United States Department of Justice has argued that the Weber
decision supports the lawfulness of race-conscious affirmative action in public
employment: "Under Title VII, private and public employers are subject to the
same standards. For that reason, a voluntary affirmative action plan adopted by a
public employer is as lawful as that of a private employer." Second Supplemental
Brief for Appellant at 11, United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th
Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
0Consideration of this question was expressly deferred by the Court: "[W]e
are not concerned with what Title VII requires or with what a court might order
to remedy a past proved violation of the Act." 443 U.S. at 200.
7 See note 6 supra; Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420, 430-32
(4th Cir. 1979).
830 Fed. Beg. 12,319 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32
Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967), and by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501
(1978). This question was also reserved by the Court: "Nor need we consider
-etitioners' contention that their affirmative action plan represented an attempt to
comply with Exec. Order No. 11,246 ....... 443 U.S. at 209 n.9.
9 The guidelines appear at 44 Fed. Beg. 4,422 (1979). They were not men-
tioned in Weber, although the United States cited them as authority for the
lawfulness of the challenged affirmative action plan. Brief for the United States
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 40-41.
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ment in Weber between the majority and the dissent regarding
the proper interpretation of the language 10 and legislative his-
tory 1 of title VII. This disagreement signals the continuing un-
settled state of affirmative action law and the need for a critical
examination of the adversarial process in title VII affirmative action
challenges.
This Comment argues that courts have been inadequate dis-
pute-resolution mechanisms in cases involving affirmative action
issues. Part I will discuss the collusive aspect of affirmative action
challenges, which typically assures exclusion of probative evidence,
because none of the usual parties-white male employee, employer,
and union-has any incentive to introduce evidence of past dis-
crimination. As an illustration, this part will examine the poten-
tially critical facts in Weber that were inadequately treated or
ignored by the lower courts hearing the case.' 2 Finally, as a solu-
tion to the deficiencies inherent in the adversarial process of affirma-
tive action challenges, part II will propose that minority bene-
1o The majority was unable to discern any congressional intention to prohibit
private initiatives toward establishing voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
programs: "[W]e cannot agree with respondent that Congress intended to prohibit
the private sector from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress
designed Title VII to achieve.. . . Congress did not intend to limit traditional
business freedom to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action." 443 U.S. at 204, 207 (footnotes omitted). The dissenters,
on the other hand, argued that the legislative history clearly demonstrated that
members of Congress "recognized that Title VII would tolerate no voluntary racial
preference, whether in favor of blacks or whites." Id. 245 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
"lThe majority rejected a strictly literal reading of the statute, id. 201,
insisting that the statutes prohibition of racial discrimination "be read against the
background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from
which the Act arose." Id. The dissenters, on the other hand, contended that the
"plain language" of the statute "flatly prohibited" the practices in the case. Id.
228 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12 Both the district and circuit courts held that a finding of past or present
discrimination would be required to validate an affirmative action program chal-
lenged under title VII. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp.
761, 766-67 (E.D. La. 1976), af'd, 563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977) rev'd, 443
U.S. 193 (1979). The Supreme Court did not require such a finding to uphold
the affirmative action plan challenged in Weber. Instead, the Court took judicial
notice of the traditional exclusion of blacks from crafts "on racial grounds." 443
U.S. at 198 n.1. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding, however, and
indicated that evidence of discrimination may be relevant in determining when a
specific affirmative action plan is permissible. Id. 200, 208. The lower courts
that have interpreted Weber have continued to examine evidence of discrimination
and racial imbalance in cases involving affirmative action challenges. See, e.g.,
Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3558-59 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080); Shaw v.
Library of Congress, 479 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1979); Tangren v. Wackenhut
Servs., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 22
Empl. Prac. Dec. ff 30,589 (Cal. S. Ct. 1980).
TITLE VII AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CHALLENGES
ficiaries of affirmative action plans be compulsorily joined by the
courts when such plans are challenged.
I. THE ADvERSAIAL PosTumRE OF AFFIRmRATE ACTION
CHALLENGES
A. The Roots of Distortion
Challenges to affirmative action plans are usually brought by
whites and males13 who do not directly benefit from the plan.14
A distortion in the adversary process thus arises, because the parties
to such a lawsuit-white male, his employer, and perhaps his union
-have no incentive to ensure that the record of the case reflects a
complete picture of possible past race and sex discrimination by
the employer or union. In fact, it is in the interest of the employer
and union to suppress such evidence, because any evidence made
available to the court may be used by minorities and women in
future lawsuits charging direct discrimination. 15 Attorneys for
the white male have no interest in directing attention to the
existence of past discrimination by the employer or union, because
such past discrimination may legally justify the challenged affirma-
tive action plan. When no party before the court has an incentive
to bring forward evidence of discrimination, the court is unlikely
to find present or past discrimination. Where existence of dis-
crimination is an issue in the affirmative action challenge, the
court's decision is therefore likely to be adverse to the minority
'3It is assumed that most affirmative action plans are intended to benefit
minorities and women, although they often also benefit whites and men. For exam-
ple, the plan challenged in Weber was an apprenticeship training program that had
never before been available to unskilled and semi-skilled Kaiser workers. Half the
places in the program were, in effect, set aside for white males. Weber challenged
only that portion of the program benefiting blacks.
There is also the possibility that a white female may challenge an affirmative
action plan by charging race discrimination, or that a minority male may challenge
a plan on the basis of sex discrimination. In such cases the litigant is unlikely to
be a beneficiary of the affirmative action plan, and the distorted posture described
here will still exist.
140f course, all workers, white and minority, male and female, benefit in-
directly from affirmative action insofar as it unites the employees by ending
divisions along racial or sexual lines, enabling them to present a more solid front
when bargaining with their employer. See generally Equality on the Job: A
Working Person's Guide to Affirmative Action (published by the Affirmative Action
Coalition, a project of La Raza Legal Alliance, the National Conference of Black
Lawyers and the National Lawyers Guild).
15Moreover, once a court has entered an adverse finding of race or sex
discrimination, the employer and union may be collaterally estopped from defending
themselves against future charges of race or sex discrimination. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See generally l~srArEmnzTmr or
JuDGmNrs §§45-48 (1942).
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beneficiaries whose interests typically are not represented in the
litigation.
While the Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers v.
Weber 16 may be interpreted as undercutting the importance of
proving past discrimination in affirmative action lawsuits,
1 7 it must
be remembered that Weber was a narrow decision, addressing only
"conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories." Is Thus, it remains unclear whether a voluntary af-
firmative action plan will be found lawful when the racial imbal-
ance is not so conspicuous, or the job category is not traditionally
segregated. What is the lawfulness, for example, of affirmative
action in industries, such as the computer industry, that have greatly
expanded since 1965? It may be very difficult to show "traditional
segregation" in such relatively new job categories.19 If proof of
past discrimination is required in such a situation, the factual dis-
tortions resulting from the typical adversarial posture of affirma-
tive action litigation will become crucial. Can the parties to an
affirmative action challenge-white male, employer, and union-be
expected to present the evidence needed to judge the lawfulness of
16 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
17See note 12 supra. In Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671
(6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3558-59 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1980)
(No. 79-1080), the court was persuaded that the challenged affirmative action plan
was lawful, in part because post-title VII discrimination had been demonstrated.
The court also noted that the existence of pre-title VII discrimination, while not
itself unlawful, may nevertheless be considered in a title VII challenge to an
affirmative action plan. Id. 689.
18443 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted). See note 12 supra.
Recent cases have emphasized that Weber involved a voluntary, private
affirmative action plan. See, e.g., Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420,
430-31 (4th Cir. 1979) (Winter, J., dissenting); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv.
Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (D. Conn. 1979). But see Drayton v. City of
St. Petersburg, 477 F. Supp. 846, 861 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (Weber cited as authority
for the proposition that a court-imposed racial hiring quota is an appropriate
remedy).
Judge Gordon, the federal district judge who originally ruled in Weber's favor,
has given the Supreme Court's decision an even narrower interpretation than the
case seems to command: "The Supreme Court has recently held that an employer,
under Title VII may even go so far, voluntarily, as to give job preference to blacks
over whites, although it may not be compelled to do so." Booth v. Board of
Directors of Nat'l Am. Bank, 475 F. Supp. 638, 653 n.12 (E.D. La. 1979)
(emphasis supplied).
19 Moreover, it seems anomalous to require evidence of traditional segregation
throughout a job category when specific evidence of past discrimination by the
litigating employer or union is available. At least one court interpreting Weber
has relied on evidence of specific discrimination to uphold a voluntary affirmative
action plan where no evidence of traditional discrimination against the job
category involved (security guards) was presented. Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs.,
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979).
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affirmative action? United Steelworkers v. Weber suggests that
this is an unrealistic expectation.
B. United Steelworkers v. Weber and Issues of Fact
In 1975, pursuant to the provisions of a 1974 collective bargain-
ing agreement 20 between Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Cor-
poration and the United Steelworkers of America, Kaiser estab-
lished a new apprenticeship training program at its Gramercy,
Louisiana plant. The program opened to incumbent Kaiser em-
ployees a number of skilled-trades positions, which previously had
been closed to them because of stringent experience requirements.
21
Under the new program, workers would be trained for a period
of time for skilled-trades positions.22 Entry into the program was
to be on a one-for-one basis-one minority employee would be
trained for each nonminority employee trained.23 Selection within
each class was based upon seniority relative to the other members
of that class.24 When two black employees with three months less
seniority than Brian Weber 25 were accepted into the program,
Weber, a white male, instituted a title VII lawsuit charging race
discrimination.
The district court found Kaiser's apprenticeship training pro-
gram unlawful on two alternative grounds. For one thing, Kaiser
had instituted its plan without a court order. The district court
contended that courts alone had the power under title VII to
establish affirmative action programs; Kaiser's self-instituted pro-
gram was therefore unlawful.26  In addition, the court held that
race-conscious affirmative action was permissible only in those cir-
cumstances "where the preferred workers were . . . identifiable
victims of unlawful hiring discrimination and where in fact there
had been ... past discrimination by the employer." 27 Because the
2OThe agreement provided that a joint labor-management committee would
review minority representation in craft-level employment positions at the Gramercy
plant and, if necessary, establish goals and time-tables in order to achieve a desired
minority ratio. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 763.
21 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 218.
22 Appendix to Supreme Court Record at 67, United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Record].
23 415 F. Supp. at 763.
24 563 F.2d at 218.
25 Record, supra note 22, at 157 (Joint Exhibit 3).
26 415 F. Supp. at 767-68.
27 563 F.2d at 223; 415 F. Supp. at 769.
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trial court found that Kaiser had never discriminated,28 the affirma-
tive plan violated title VII's proscription of discrimination "against
any individual." 29 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit took issue with the
district court's ruling that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative
action is unlawful unless court-imposed. 0 It affirmed the district
court's decision for Weber on the second ground, however, holding
that race-conscious affirmative action is permissible only to restore
employees to the positions they would have occupied but for prior
discrimination.81 Quoting with approval the factual finding of
the district court, Judge Gee, writing for a divided panel, based his
decision on the resolution of a single factual issue:
The evidence further established that Kaiser had a no-
discrimination hiring policy from the time its Gramercy
plant opened in 1958, and that none of its black employees
who were offered on-the-job training opportunities over
more senior white employees pursuant to the 1974 Labor
Agreement had been the subject of any prior employment
discrimination by Kaiser.
32
Thus, although the "lack" of past discrimination by Kaiser
formed the basis of the appellate court's decision in Weber, the
record of the case shows that almost no attention was given to this
issue during the trial. Indeed, none of the parties even attempted
to show that Kaiser had discriminated in the past. The principal
evidence relating to the existence or absence of discrimination by
Kaiser consisted of testimony by the Kaiser-Gramercy Industrial
Relations Superintendent. Under cross-examination by Weber's
lawyer, he testified that Kaiser had not discriminated against mi-
norities in the past,33 and that Kaiser had, in fact, taken affirmative
measures to attract minority applicants for skilled-trade positions.34
This testimony was not questioned by lawyers for Kaiser or the
28 415 F. Supp. at 764.
29 Section 703(a) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 0.OOe-9-(a) (1).
30 563 F.2d at 223.
3lId. 225.
32 Id. 224 (quoting 415 F. Supp. at 764) (emphasis supplied by Fifth Circuit).
33 Record, supra note 22, at 77-78. But see Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979)
(Kaiser found to have discriminated against minorities in a similar crafts program
at another Louisiana plant).
34 Record, supra note 22, at 76-77.
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United Steelworkers, nor was it contradicted by the testimony of
any other witness 3 5 or by any exhibit presented to the court.30
There was ample probative evidence available to anyone want-
ing to assert a contrary position.3 7 No one presented it, however,
leaving open the question of what the courts might have found had
they been presented with evidence of discrimination. Two things,
however, are clear. First, the proportion of minority workers hired
by Kaiser-Gramercy was significantly lower than that existing out-
side the walls of the plant; for many years the Kaiser work force
remained almost totally white in a community that was almost
fifty percent black. Second, none of the parties in the Weber case
wanted that fact examined by the courts during the litigation.
The other witnesses in the one-day trial were Brian Weber, who testified
that Kaiser had never maintained discriminatory seniority lists, Record, supra note
22, at 35, Fortune Maurin (name misspelled as Moran in the transcript), another
white Kaiser employee who testified concerning the effects of Kaiser's apprenticeship
training program on himself; and Thomas Bouble, national director of Equal
Opportunity Affairs for Kaiser, who testified that Kaiser needed race-conscious
affirmnative action to overcome the effects of societal discrimination. Record, supra
note 22, at 90-104.
aS The exhibits presented were:
Joint Exhibit A - Stipulation of the parties as to jurisdiction, Weber's
status as an employee and union member, Kaiser's
status as a corporation, the United Steelworkers of
America status as a union, the 1974 agreement
between Kaiser and the United Steelworkers, the
operation of Kaiser employment practices as to
skilled trades prior to 1974, the operation of the
post-1974 apprenticeship selection process, the
seniority status of the Kaiser employees who were
selected for the program, the length of training
and other advantages accruing to apprenticeship
trainees, the lack of antidiscrimination laws in
Louisiana and in Gramercy, and the authenticity
and admissibility of the other exhibits.
Joint Exhibit 1 - Copy of the 1974 Labor Agreement.
Joint Exhibit 2 - Copy of the memorandum of understanding con-
cerning operation of the apprenticeship training
program.
Joint Exhibit 3 - Bid lists on each of the six training programs
posted to the date of Weber's action.
Kaiser Exhibit 1 - Racial makeup of Kaiser-Gramercy craft families,
February, 1975.
Kaiser Exhibit 2- Characteristics of trainees selected by Kaiser-
Gramercy pursuant to the 1974 program.
Kaiser Exhibit 3 - Kaiser-Gramercy craft employees, by trade and
race, for 1972, 1973, and 1974.
Kaiser Exhibit 4 - Report letter, with attached chart, to the United
Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Headquarters
on operation of the 1974 program.
3 7 See notes 41-71 infra & accompanying text
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The evidence of discrimination by Kaiser that could have been,
but was not, introduced into the record was relevant to meet each
of three general standards used by the Supreme Court to justify
race- or gender-conscious affirmative action as a remedy in direct
discrimination suits. First, affirmative action may be lawful if
taken voluntarily and in good faith to remedy societal or institu-
tionalized discrimination of some kind, discrimination that is not
unlawful or that has occurred elsewhere than in the particular
employment setting in question. This standard was partially
adopted by the Supreme Court in Weber, but its applicability in
other contexts has not been settled.8  Second, affirmative action
may be lawful when the employer is guilty of discrimination against
a race or gender class under a disparate-impact standard such as the
one applied in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.39 Finally, race- or gender-
conscious affirmative action may be lawful where the employer is
guilty of intentional discrimination. This standard is similar to
that used to judge whether unconstitutional discrimination exists
under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
40
1. Evidence Concerning Societal Discrimination
If it is true that Kaiser had a nondiscriminatory hiring policy
from the time it opened in 1958, its hiring practices in the late
1950s and early 1960s were unusually enlightened ones for a com-
pany operating in rural Louisiana. Census figures show that in
1960, the unemployment rate for minorities in Louisiana was
twice as great as that for whites, 9.5 percent versus 4.7 percent.
41
In 1959, the median income for white families in Louisiana was
$5,288 per annum, while for minority families it was $2,238 per
annum.4 Over sixty-five percent of minority families in Louisiana
had incomes below $3,000 annually, while less than twenty-five
percent of white families had incomes that low. 43 In the two
parishes where the Kaiser-Gramercy plant hired its workers, 797 of
4,587 minority workers in the labor force-17.4 percent-were un-
employed, as compared with 297 of 5,243 white workers in the
labor force-5.4 percent.44
3SSee notes 5-8 supra & accompanying text.
39 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See note 55 infra.
40 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
41U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsUs, UNImT STATES CMEsUs OF POPULATION: 1960
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Some evidence of this societal discrimination was presented
in the Weber litigation. A Kaiser official testified that the Kaiser-
Gramercy plant had a five-year prior experience requirement for
entry into skilled-trade jobs, which none of the minority workers
or minority applicants could meet. He expressed a belief that
most applicants possessing the requisite prior experience obtained
it while working in the building trades, and that because of mas-
sive discrimination in that industry, minority workers were effec-
tively excluded from obtaining the experience. His theory ap-
parently coincided with the theory of all parties in the cases, that
Kaiser had instituted its affirmative action program to eliminate the
racial imbalance in its skilled-trades work force caused by dis-
crimination in other industries. The implausibility of Kaiser's
other contention-that it had never discriminated, even in the 1950s
and early 1960s when employment discrimination was pervasive
in Louisiana 46-was never challenged.
Both lower courts found that the proffered evidence was in-
sufficient to justify Kaiser's affirmative action program, and it is
unclear whether either court would have found the census data
persuasive. Significantly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts, taking judicial notice of traditional segregation "on racial
grounds." 47  Societal discrimination therefore appears to be suf-
ficient, if not necessary, to uphold a voluntary affirmative action
plan against a title VII challenge.
48
2. Evidence Concerning Disparate Treatment of
Minority Workers
In 1965, when the Civil Rights Act took effect,49 minorities
accounted for thirty-two of 681 Kaiser workers-4.7 percent.0  At
the same time, minorities accounted for approximately thirty-nine
percent of the available labor pool.51 This gross disparity between
45 Record, supra note 22, at 63.
46 See 443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47 Id. 198 n.1.
48 See note 19 supra.
49 See § 716(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
266 (1964) (declaring the effective date to be one year after the date of
enactment).
6OSummary, Atomic Energy Commission compliance review conducted at
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., Gramercy, Louisiana, on Nov. 16, 1970, at 2
(obtained from U.S. Dep't of Labor, Offce of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-.
grams, Washington, D.C.), also referred to in Petition for Certiorari of the United
States and the Equal Opportunity Commission at 18.
5'Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 228 (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
1552 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the Kaiser work force and the local labor pool is not explained
in the opinions of either the district court or the Fifth Circuit5
2
During the trial, no inquiry was made into the hiring practices
which created this disparity,55 although the disparity is precisely
what led to the adoption of the apprenticeship training program
which was challenged in the Weber litigation.54 If Kaiser had hired
a number of minority workers roughly corresponding to the per-
centage of minority workers in the local labor pool between 1958
and 1965, approximately thirty-nine percent of the most senior
Kaiser-Gramercy employees in 1975 should have been minority
workers. Because that was not the case; Kaiser had to select rela-
tively junior minority employees in order to reach its goal of
fifty percent minority participation in its crafts training program.
The basis of Brian Weber's claim was that he and other white
workers rejected for crafts training had plant seniority greater than
that of black workers selected for the program. No one in the
Weber case asked, and no one explained, however, why so few
black workers had sufficient seniority to enter the program without
the use of a quota. Instead, Kaiser merely contended that it had
never discriminated, and both lower courts entered a finding of
no discrimination.
Under the disparate-impact test announced in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,55 such a statistical disparity could be used by a party
to require further examination by the court of Kaiser's hiring
practices.5 6 Hiring qualifications imposed by the plant that dis-
qualified a greater percentage of minority workers than white
workers would have to be shown by Kaiser to be related to job
5 2 The lower courts were certainly aware of the disparity, however. While
discussing the operation of Kaiser's apprenticeship selection, the Fifth Circuit
commented: "As predictable, black employees have been admitted to Kaiser's
on-the-job training program with less seniority than their white competitors."
Id. 218. The predictability lies in the disparity between the racial composition
of the Kaiser work force and the racial composition of the outside labor pool in
the early years of the plant's operation-the years in which the white employees,
later denied entry into the training program, were first hired.
53 See notes 35 & 36 supra and text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
54 Another disparity noted by the district court was that prior to 1974 only
five employees, approximately two percent of the skilled-trades work force, were
minority workers. 415 F. Supp. at 764.
5 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Under the Supreme Court's standard in Griggs, a
job qualification violates title VII if it has a disparate impact on minorities and is
not related to job performance. Id. 431. Because the prior-experience requirement
for skilled-trades positions excluded virtually all minorities and women, federal
regulations required that Kaiser show that the prior experience was a business
necessity. 41 C.F..R. § 60-3.3A (1979).
N6 For a discussion of the use of statistics in discrimination cases, see Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329 (1977).
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performance, or Kaiser would be guilty of unlawful discrimination
for any such practices existing after title VII took effect in 1965.
Neither lower court made clear in its opinion whether only illegal,
post-Act discrimination could justify affirmative action, or whether
similar, lawful, pre-Act discrimination could also be a justifica-
tion.57 If the latter is true, imposing a Griggs test on Kaiser's
practices from 1958 to 1965 would have cast serious doubt on
Kaiser's contention that it had never discriminated.
More than mere employment statistics concerning plant-wide
hiring was suppressed in Weber. Also missing from the record
is documentation of federal-contract compliance investigations of
the Kaiser-Gramercy plant. Under the authority of Executive
Order 11,246,51 which requires federal contractors to take affirma-
tive measures to eliminate employment discrimination, and which
also demands the insertion of nondiscrimination clauses in govern-
ment contracts, investigators from the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) 59 conducted compliance reviews of Kaiser's antidiscrimina-
tion efforts in 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1976.60 After the 1970 review,
the Chief of the Contract Compliance Office at the AEC wrote a
letter to the Kaiser-Gramercy plant manager.61 The letter referred
to a prior agreement between the AEC and Kaiser to consider
the minority population in the available labor force as comprising
fifty percent of the total pool (pending adjustment upon comple-
tion of the 1970 census).62 Noting that the level of minority em-
ployment at the Kaiser-Gramercy plant was approximately 9.9 per-
cent,6 3 the letter stated that Kaiser's minority hiring ratio of 16.9
6 7 See note 17 supra.
5830 Fed. Beg. 12,319 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32
Fed. Beg. 14,303 (1967), and by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Beg. 46,501
(1978).
59The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and its major responsibilities
transferred to the newly established Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1974. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 5814(a), 5841(f) (1976).
6o Copies of documents summarizing these reviews may be obtained from U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Washington, D.C.
61 Letter from Guy W. McCarty, Chief, Contract Compliance Office, to J. W.
Melancon, Plant Manager, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., Gramercy, Louisiana
(Jan. 25, 1971) (obtained from U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as McCarty Letter].
62 Id.
63 EEO Compliance Review Report, Part fl-Employment by Race, Occu.
pation and Sex (obtained from U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs, Washington, D.C.). The text of the McCarty Letter, note 61
supra, indicates the level of minority employment to be 0.9 percent. This was
obviously a typographical error in view of the statistics compiled in the EEO Report
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percent during the past year was "unsatisfactory" and ordered
Kaiser to revise its Affirmative Action Compliance Program (AACP)
within thirty days."
An appendix to the letter listed specific deficiencies regarding
Kaiser's violations of federal laws and regulations.6 5 Several of
these deficiencies related to the issue of disparate impact. First,
of forty-nine professional employees at the plant, not one was a
minority person. This was termed a "very unsatisfactory situa-
tion," and methods for recruiting minority professional employees
were suggested. Second, affirmative action to identify and attract
minority employees, required by federal regulations, had not been
taken. The AEC further declared: "Over the years, jobs have
been filled by non-minorities because suitable minority applicants
were not in the pipeline or because they were not adequately
considered." In addition, Kaiser had not effectively utilized avail-
able minority-recruiting sources. During the period from Novem-
ber 1, 1969 to October 31, 1970, forty-six new employees had been
hired (exclusive of transfers and military returnees), of which eleven,
or 23.9 percent, were minorities (nine, or 19.5 percent, were black).
Of twenty-one new employees hired in EEO-l categories (clerical
and above), only two, or 9.5 percent, were black. Of the remaining
twenty-five jobs, eight were in the skilled trades (none went to
blacks), ten were semi-skilled positions (six, or sixty percent, went
to black workers), and seven were laborer positions (one, or 14.2
percent, went to a black worker). Kaiser had not actively re-
cruited at a local, predominantly black university, except when
looking for professional employees. Finally, as of August 31, 1970,
only one of Kaiser's 132 supervisors was a minority person. Kaiser
had no plan to ensure that minority employees who aspired to
supervisory positions had an equal opportunity to attain them.
And, finally, of 246 craftsworkers at the plant, none was black.
It was suggested that Kaiser establish a training program for crafts
jobs and that future hiring into crafts positions "include at least
the minority ratio that exists in the company's recruitment area.'"
All of the findings in this letter relate to illegal, post-Act dis-
crimination. The letter documents the. significant statistical dis-
parities between the available labor pool and the minority work
force at the plant, and strongly indicates that, prior to the chal-
lenged affirmative action plan, minority job applicants were not
adequately considered for openings at the Kaiser plant.
64 McCarty Letter, supra note 61.
65Id.
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In 1978, another AEG compliance-review officer informally
visited the Kaiser-Gramercy plant. The officer's findings during
the visit, detailed in an internal memorandum, 6 included five
"serious" problems with Kaiser-Gramercy employment practices.
Three of these problems relate to the issue of disparate impact.
For one thing, a female clerical employee was terminated because
of pregnancy, and was not rehired when she sought reemployment
shortly after the termination. Second, Kaiser had not validated
its experience requirements for direct hire or transfer to the skilled
trades, although such validation was required by federal regula-
tions.67 Finally, Kaiser had transferred several white employees
into the skilled trades who did not possess the prior experience
ostensibly required of all transferees. No black employees had
ever been given the same consideration.
This memorandum is particularly relevant to Kaiser's con-
tendon that it had never discriminated against minority employees.
The company's practice of waiving its stringent prior-experience
requirement for certain white employees, while requiring that all
minority employees meet the requirement, casts serious doubt on
the business necessity of the prior-experience requirement. This,
taken together with the fact that Kaiser never validated the prior-
experience requirement, raises serious questions of illegal race and
sex discrimination. Like other documents indicating the existence
of past discrimination by Kaiser, however, this memorandum was
not introduced at the Weber trial.
The existence of these government findings casts a new light
on the issues of the case. Both lower courts in Weber agreed that
race-conscious affirmative action is permissible only to remedy dis-
crimination occurring within the discrete employment setting to
which the affirmative action plan applies.68 Based upon a factual
finding that Kaiser had never discriminated, each court then ruled
against the company's voluntary affirmative action plan. 9 The
existence of evidence that Kaiser had discriminated-recorded by
a federal administrative agency 0 and certainly available to Kaiser
66Memorandum from Ben L. West, Facility Compliance Officer, Atomic
Energy Comm'n (Jan. 31, 1973) (obtained from U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of
Federal Contracts Compliance Programs, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as
West memorandum].
67 See note 55 supra.
6s See notes 27 & 31 supra & accompanying text.
69 See notes 28 & 32 supra & accompanying text.
70 See Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 300-05 (1978), for a discussion of the significance of government findings
of past discrimination in an analogous setting.
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-was not revealed to the lower courts, although the parties in-
volved in the litigation believed that past discrimination was a
relevant issue.
3. Evidence of Intentional Discrimination
The 1970 and 1973 contract compliance investigations 71 also
uncovered evidence of intentional discrimination by Kaiser. The
AEG found in 1970 that suitable minority applicants "were not in
the pipeline or .. . they were not adequately considered." 72 The
AEC's compliance review officer was also informed by several black
employees that white union members "had actively discouraged
Negroes from bidding on certain jobs and that white union mem-
bers had been responsible for various other forms of intimidation
at the plant." 73 Finally, one of the five "serious" problems with
Kaiser-Gramercy employment practices uncovered by the AEG in
1973 was an incident in which a white employee had called a black
plant guard by a racial epithet. Kaiser had taken no corrective
action, although it was not the first incident of its kind.74 While
these findings alone do not establish the existence of intentional
discrimination by Kaiser, they suggest that it existed and that
other evidence might have been available to an interested party
willing to investigate.
II. COMPULSORY JOINDER OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN
TITLE VII AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CHALLENGES
The failure of any party to introduce evidence of past dis-
crimination in United Steelworkers v. Weber 75 can be explained
by examining the incentives and disincentives operating for each
party. For Weber, there were no incentives favoring introduction.
Indeed, such evidence would have weakend his case. For Kaiser
and the Steelworkers, introduction of such evidence would have
strengthened their case against Weber, but would also have left
them both vulnerable to lawsuits by women and minorities at the
Gramercy plant if illegal race discrimination were found to have
existed.7 This dilemma was candidly acknowledged by the Steel-
workers:
71 See note 60 supra & accompanying text.
72 McCarty Letter, supra note 61.
73Id.
74 West memorandum, supra note 66.
75443 U.S. 193 (1979).
76 See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
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[E]ven if employers and unions were quite convinced that
they had violated Title VII, they would be unlikely to
want to proclaim their own guilt. It is one thing to take
prospective corrective action; it is quite another to make
an admission which automatically entitles employees to
recover backpay for past sins.
77
The declaration by both lower courts hearing Weber that
"Kaiser had a no-discrimination hiring policy from the time its
Gramercy plant opened in 1958" 78 is therefore not surprising.
This finding was compounded, however, by the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion that none of the minority employees at Kaiser were even
victims of societal discrimination: "Whatever other effects societal
discrimination may have, it has had-by the specific finding of the
court below-no effect on the seniority of any party here." 79
Weber thus illustrates how the distorted adversarial posture
of affirmative action challenges operates to exclude potentially
critical evidence of discrimination and how modern courts focusing
on recently occurring, discrete acts perpetrated by one party
against another are unable to address the conditions of race and sex
discrimination in society.80 This situation could be remedied by
joining other parties to affirmative action challenges who do have
an interest in showing that discrimination has occurred. Those
parties are the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs and
the beneficiaries of any damages or injunctive relief which might
result from a court finding of discrimination. Typically, these
beneficiaries will be minorities and women.
Minority and women workers could become parties to affirma-
tive action challenges under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
77 Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 16, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
78415 F. Supp. at 764, quoted in 563 F.2d at 224 (emphasis omitted).
79 563 F.2d at 226 (emphasis in original). justice Rebnquist in his Weber
dissent, seized on this statement as rebutting the claim that minority workers at
Kaiser were victims of societal discrimination. 443 U.S. at 225, n.6 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Of course, if minority workers at Kaiser were not discriminated against
by the employer, and if their low seniority was not the result of societal dis-
crimination, the gross disparities between the racial composition of the Kaiser
work force and the racial composition of the surrounding labor pool must have
been either mere coincidence or the result of some action or inaction by the
minority workers themselves.
80 For an interesting discussion of how antidiscrimination principles used in
litigation actually further racial discrimination by focusing on discrete acts of dis-
crimination rather than the social and economic conditions created by discrimination,
see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MsmN. L. 1kv. 1049, 1052-57
(1978).
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Procedure, which allows for intervention,81 or under rule 20, which
concerns permissive joinder.82 Both rules assume, however, some
knowledge of legal rights and representation on the part of those
who would become new parties to an action. This may not be an
appropriate assumption.83 Moreover, intervention and permissive
joinder are designed to permit only those with an interest in
vindicating specific rights to become parties in actions where those
rights may be adjudicated. While minority and women workers
certainly have a sufficient interest in affirmative action challenges
to meet the tests for intervention and permissive joinder, the
mere availability of such procedures may not be enough to ensure
participation by the minorities or women in an affirmative action
lawsuit. Particularly where it is likely, as in Weber, that certain
effective defenses to the program may not be presented by the
employer and union, affirmative action beneficiaries should be
included as parties to ensure that the court is presented with all
relevant evidence before it determines the validity of an affirma-
tive action program.
81 Rule 24 provides for both mandatory and permissive intervention. FED. R.
Civ. P. 24. A court must allow a person to intervene under rule 24(a), if he files
a timely application claiming that he has an interest in the action, that disposition
in his absence may impair his ability to protect his interest and that his interest is
inadequately represented by existing parties. A court may permit a person to
intervene under rule 24(b), if he files a timely application and his claim or
defense has a question of law or fact in common with the main action.
Commentators have recently explored the feasibility of using rule 24 as the
basis for minority participation in affirmative action challenges. See Jones, Liti-
gation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative
Action, 14 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 32 (1979); Comment, The Case for Minority
Participation in Reverse Discrimination Litigation, 67 CALiF. L. lEv. 191 (1979).
82 Rule 20 would permit minorities and women to be joined as defendants in
an affirmative action challenge, but only if the plaintiff/challenger asserts a claim
against them. FED. R. Civ. P. 20. It is very unlikely that challengers will
voluntarily add parties who may strengthen the defense.
83 Minority and women employees did in fact attempt to intervene in Weber
but filed their motion only after oral arguments had been presented to the Supreme
Court. Their motion requested "special leave to intervene" and "an order vacating
the judgment below and remanding for a new trial with instructions to add
intervenors as party defendants." Their tardiness in filing the motion was
attributed to
the omissions by the parties and the courts below, combined with the
social realities in the Gramercy area. The discrimination in the plant
and in the surrounding community which has denied applicants these
positions in the plant are the same factors that have prevented applicants
from acting sooner in this case. These factors permitted Black and women
workers to learn only just recently that the key defenses of the affirmative
action program had been suppressed. Furthermore, applicants' realistic
fears of retaliation for speaking out against such discrimination . . . have
impeded applicants and their class from aggressively pursuing this case
at an earlier time.
Motion of Rudy Gorden, et al. For Special Leave to Intervene at 4. The motion
was denied without comment. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 442 U.S. 927 (1979).
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Thus, this Comment proposes that the courts should use their
equitable and procedural powers to compel the joinder of minority
and women workers as parties in affirmative action challenges. This
can be accomplished in federal courts by compulsory joinder under
rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. s  Two argu-
84 Rule 19 is entitled "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication." The
full text of subdivision (a) is as follows:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action
in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not
been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a de-
fendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the
action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
FED. B. Cxv. P. 19(a). Persons joined under this subdivision are commonly called
"necessary" parties. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 124 (1967).
The full text of rule 19(b) provides:
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a
person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a
party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience
the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dis-
missed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The
factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him
or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective pro-
visions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered
in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Fn. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Persons who must be joined under this subdivision to
avoid dismissal of the action are commonly called "indispensable" parties. See
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 124 (1967).
Rule 19(b) is not a limitation on the powers of courts in the sense that a
failure to join necessary or indispensable parties deprives a court of jurisdiction over
the parties already before the court. Rather, the rule provides guidelines for the
courts to determine whether, "in equity and good conscience," an action should
proceed in the absence of certain interested parties. Id. 118-25. See generally
Advisory Committee Notes, Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 89-90 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Notes]; 7 C. WriGHT
& A. Mum, FDmERAL PAcTcE AND PnocxmuRE § 1611 (1972); Hazard, Indis-
pensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
1254 (1961); Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L.
REv. 327 (1957).
Because many compulsory joinder situations involve absent parties who may
feasibly be joined, a party or a court may frequently raise the issue of failure to
join without raising the specter of dismissal with prejudice. It is only when the
absent party would defeat a court's diversity jurisdiction, could make a valid
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ments will be examined: (1) that to continue the litigation without
joinder would violate the due process rights of the minorities and
women; and (2) that courts lack power to hear affirmative action
challenges when the adversary process has been impaired by the
absence of women and minority parties.
A. Compulsory Joinder and Due Process
No one may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.8 Hence, all persons with a liberty or property
interest in a court proceeding must be joined as parties. This
view finds support in a number of cases involving employment
issues.
An indispensable-party theory was successfully used by several
railroads in a dispute with two unions over diminishing jobs. In
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks, 6 for example, the court attempted to settle a
dispute between the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks and the rail-
road. The dispute arose when the railroad installed computers
which eliminated much of the work that had previously been
assigned to members of another union, the Order of Railroad Tele-
graphers. Under the terms of its collective bargaining agreement,
the Telegraphers union claimed that its members were entitled to
retain their positions with the railroad, and that its members should
therefore operate the new computers. But, if the Telegraphers
union members operated the computers, some members of the
Clerks union would be displaced, and the Clerks union members
were likewise protected by a collective bargaining agreement. As
it became clear that the railroad intended to replace employees
with computers, both unions moved to protect their memberships.
Each union filed claims with the National Railroad Adjustment
Board (NRAB). The NRAB treated each claim as a dispute be-
tween the railroad and the complaining union, not involving the
other union. In two separate hearings before two separate referees,
the NRAB entered orders in favor of both unions. Faced with
objection to venue, or is beyond service of process that the court must determine
under rule 19(b) whether to proceed or dismiss the action. The Advisory Com-
mittee Notes make clear that the four considerations listed in rule 19(b) are not
exclusive. Advisory Committee Notes, supra, at 92. See generally Hazard, supra;
Reed, supra.
85 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
86 188 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951). This case is but part of a long struggle
involving the Telegraphers union, the Clerks union, and the railroads. For history
of the legal battles, see Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union
Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157, 158-60 (1966); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Union Pac.
R.R., 349 F.2d 408, 409 (10th Cir. 1965).
[VCol. 128:1543
TITLE VII AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CHALLENGES
presumptively valid orders compelling it to employ two persons
in each of several jobs, the railroad sought and received an injunc-
tion against enforcement of the NRAB's orders, contending that
the NRAB proceedings' should not have been separate ones where
they involved "rival" claims to the same jobs. The court granted
the injunction, holding that the NRAB should have joined the
Telegraphers in the proceeding involving the claim of the Clerks.'I
In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, Texas, &
Mexico Railway 88 after a similar dispute had arisen, the Tele-
graphers sought and won an award of the disputed jobs from the
NRAB, then sought enforcement of that award. The Fifth Circuit
found the award to be invalid because the NRAB had given the
Clerks neither notice nor opportunity to be heard. The court
also held that the enforcement lawsuit itself could not proceed
because of the Telegraphers' failure to join necessary parties-the
Clerks union and the individual clerk whose job the Telegraphers
sought. The court reasoned that it could not enter an order for
enforcement of the NRAB's ruling without requiring the dismissal
of a member of the Clerks. The court stated that the individual
clerk's interest in his right to a job was "real and obvious" 89 and
was sufficient to keep the court from hearing the enforcement suit
without his presence as a party.
Union members used the indispensable-party theory to obtain
dismissal of a suit in McMurray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men.90 Two union locals, one in Ohio, the other in Pennsylvania,
had carried a dispute over seniority rights in an interstate-railroad
run to the highest tribunal of the union. When the dispute was
decided in favor of the Ohio local, members of the Pennsylvania
local asked a federal court to grant an injunction against enforce-
87The court relied on 'logic and reason" to construe an NEAB rule providing
that the Board must give due notice of all hearings "to the employee or employees
and the carrier or carriers involved in any disputes submitted." 188 F.2d at 306.
After concluding as a matter of law that the Railway Labor Act did not require
the NRAB to conduct separate hearings on the separate claims of the Clerks and
Telegraphers, the court declared that the notice provision required the NBAB to
join the Telegraphers in the claim of the Clerks. "We can think of no employee
having a more vital interest in a dispute than one whose job is sought by another
employee or group of employees." Id.
88229 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 997 (1956).
89 Id. 67. Accord, Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union
Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157 (1966) (NBAB must hear competing unions' claims in
work-assignment dispute in one proceeding). But see Whitehouse v. Illinois
Central R.R., 349 U.S. 366 (1955) (writ of mandamus to compel joinder of rival
union denied where NBAB had not decided merits of case).
9054 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1931). Accord, Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S.F. By.,
171 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 916 (1949).
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ment of the decision by the union. The court noted the conten-
tion of the plaintiffs that their seniority rights were property rights
and dismissed the case on the grounds that necessary parties were
absent-the Ohio local members who also claimed a right to the
same property.
This line of cases demonstrates that an employee's interest in
retaining his or her job can be sufficient to invoke compulsory
joinder when that job is the subject of a court action. A corollary
to the theory that compulsory joinder is an adjunct of due process,
however, is the fact that if an interest does not rise to the level
of life, liberty or property, it is insufficient to invoke compulsory
joinder. A number of courts have held that the interest of em-
ployees in some employment opportunities is insufficient to invoke
compulsory joinder. In Eaton v. Courtaulds North America Inc.,91
for example, the defendant employer claimed that the plaintiffs,
minority workers, had failed to join as parties the white workers
who would be affected by an alteration in seniority. The employer
argued that seniority rights are property rights and therefore pro-
tected by the fifth amendment from divestiture without due process.
The court refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of that property
right, stating: "[W]here the 'property' right is acquired by means
of or because of some illegal activity (i.e., a discriminatory seniority
system) the right is not vested and the court may alter it without
the presence in court of those affected." 92 Similarly, in Todd v.
Joint Apprenticeship Committee of Steelworkers,93 the court held
that the interest of illegally favored employees in continuing to
benefit from their preferential treatment is insufficient to invoke
compulsory joinder.
Eaton and Todd were decided in favor of the minority em-
ployees, but they may be a source of trouble to civil-rights advocates
in the future. For one thing, confusion may result if employment
rights are protected by a compulsory-joinder doctrine only to the
extent that they are property rights. This approach may raise as
many questions as it answers. Is the job protected by a contract?
Is it a public job, and, if so, is it recognized in the employee's
jurisdiction as a property right?" If the job is a property right,
915 Empl. Prac. Dec. 118,032 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
92 Id. at 6,781.
93223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. IMl. 1963), vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
94 The Supreme Court has held that property interests in continued public
employment "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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does that mean that the concomitant seniority is also a property
right?
Second, the test used in Eaton and Todd is outcome-determina-
tive. The courts in both cases reasoned that a right must be a
legitimate property right to be protected by compulsory joinder,
but each court had already decided that the interest asserted by
the nonminorities was not a legitimate property right. By choosing
to apply the "legitimate property right" test, each court had thus
already determined that the defendant employer's motion to dis-
miss, on the grounds of failure to join necessary parties, would fail.
Under the Eaton approach, therefore, the beneficiaries of the
Kaiser affirmative action plan would be subject to joinder only
if it were first shown that their right to join the crafts training
program was a "legitimate" right. Thus, they could be joined-
but only after the court had in effect decided that the affirmative
action plan was lawful. Under the Missouri Railroad approach,
however, the beneficiaries would be subject to compulsory joinder
simply because Brian Weber sought to displace them from their
jobs.
A motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary or indispensa-
ble parties does not of itself assert the legitimacy of any right. It
does challenge the power of a court to determine the legitimacy
of a right without representation before the court for all who
claim the right. The theory that compulsory joinder is an ele-
ment of due process fails to recognize this difference and may there-
fore be an inadequate basis for assuring that beneficiaries of affirma-
tive action plans will be compulsorily joined when such plans are
challenged. 95
B. Compulsory Joinder and the Powers of Courts:
An Alternative to the Due Process Theory
Compulsory joinder involves not so much the vindication of
a right as a limitation on the powers of courts.96 A right must
be asserted by someone with standing to assert it. The need for
compulsory joinder, on the other hand, may be asserted by anyone;
it may even be raised by a court sua sponte.9 7 The ideology
95 In Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
116-18 (1968), the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the lower court's contention
that an absent necessary party has a substantive right to be joined in litigation
under rule 19. Because the right to due process is a substantive right protecting
specffic, articulated interests in life, liberty or property, the Court's holding in
Patterson is a further indication of the inadequacy of the due process argument.
96 See note 84 supra.
97 See, e.g., Jett v. Zink, 362 F.2d 723, 726 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
987 (1966).
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behind an adversary court proceeding is that the "true" facts and
"correct" law will emerge when forceful advocates of differing
sides air their arguments. When an issue to be adjudicated is one
upon which the opposing sides actually agree, and the disagreeing
side is not before the court, the adversary process ceases to function
properly and it is necessary to bring in the disagreeing party.98
Compulsory joinder describes a limitation on the powers of
courts that is much like subject-matter-jurisdiction limitations.
Long before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promul-
gated, the Supreme Court dismissed cases for failure to join neces-
sary parties. For example, in a leading case, Mallow v. Hinde,99
the Court refused to allow a decree for specific performance of a
contract because the validity of that contract hinged upon a validity
of another, conflicting contract, the parties to which were not be-
fore the Court. In dismissing the case, the Court stated:
We do not put this case upon the ground of jurisdic-
tion, but upon a much broader ground, which must
equally apply to all Courts of equity, whatever may be
their structure as to jurisdiction. We put it on the
ground that no Court can adjudicate directly upon a per-
son's right, without the party being either actually or
constructively before the Court.100
While rule 19(a) defines somewhat the degree of interest re-
quired to invoke compulsory joinder,1°1 the Court's reasoning in
Mallow v. Hinde suggests the basis for a fuller definition. First,
the absent party must have an interest sufficient to pass standing
requirements, if the absent party were to assert that interest in
separate litigation; and second, the interest of the absent party must
be unlikely to be asserted by any of the existent parties. Standing
is, of course, the threshold requirement for-any party to an action;
in this instance, it would prevent those without a true interest
in the litigation from becoming parties. The second requirement
is suggested by the nature of the adversary system itself. Where
the plaintiff and the defendant are not true adversaries concerning
the issues to be litigated, compulsory joinder is needed to provide
98This is true only in courts that rely exclusively on adversary process. In
other forums, such as family and juvenile courts, the court itself becomes a fact-
finding instrument, cross-examining witnesses and taking responsibility for un-
covering evidence that might not otherwise appear. The court thus becomes a
substitute for missing adversaries in these limited situations.
9925 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193 (1827).
:LO Id. 198.
101 See note 84 supra & accompanying text.
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the adversaries necessary for a just determination of law and fact.
These two requirements, though not an explicit part of rule 19,
have frequently been behind the reasoning of courts granting or
denying motions to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties in
employment litigation.
102
When neither adversely affected employees nor their unions
have been named in litigation over jobs, courts have often required
the joinder of both as parties. For example, in Nix v. Spector
Freight System, Inc.,103 a dispute arising from the merger of two
companies and the consequent elimination of jobs, the court held
that, where the plaintiffs sought jobs held by other employees,
those employees and their union were necessary parties. In Neal
v. System Board of Adjustment,'" a race-discrimination charge
brought under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act was dis-
missed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but the court
also commented that the complaint had failed to join indispen-
sable parties-the union and the adversely affected employees., 5
When, on the other hand, adversely affected employees are
not named in a complaint, but their union is, courts have often
found that the employees are not necessary parties. In Thompson
v. New York Central Railroad,08 union members alleged that a
contract signed by their union unfairly discriminated against them,
because they had criticized the union's financial practices. The
defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that plaintiffs had failed
to join indispensable parties-the employees who would be affected
by the requested relief. The court answered: "In the absence of a
showing that the benefitted employees' interests are not the same as
the defendant union's, the motion to bring in the employees as
indispensable parties is denied." 07 The same motion was made
with the same result in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 08 a title
VII action alleging sex discrimination. In denying the defendants'
motion to dismiss for failure to join male employees, the court
102 See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d
871, 875 (6th Cir. 1974); Le Beau v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798 (7th
Cir. 1973).
103264 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1959).
30 348 F.2d 722, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1965).
105 Id. Accord, Bremer v. St. Louis S.W. R.R., 310 F. Supp. 1333, 1340
(E.D. Mo. 1969) (rule 19 requires joinder of union and male employee holding
disputed job in sex discrimination suit).
106250 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 361 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1966).
107 250 F. Supp. at 178.
10s 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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noted that the union was a party and had a duty to represent the
absent male employees as well as female employees. The court
added: "In fact, since a majority of the . . . employees were male,
it is not unreasonable to assume that the officers of the Union were
elected by a majority of male members and would, therefore, be
responsive to their interests." 109
Thus, when the interest of an absent party in vindicating em-
ployment rights is already represented by an existent party, joinder
is not required. The mere presence of a union in a lawsuit, how-
ever, is not sufficient to ensure adequate representation of union
members who benefit from the practices a plaintiff seeks to enjoin.
In Banks v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad,"10 for example, a
minority employee sought retroactive seniority for himself and other
minority employees. The employer moved to dismiss for failure to
join white employees as indispensable parties. Noting that the re-
quested relief would adversely affect white employees and that the
union's duty of fair representation extends to all employees, the
court ordered the white employees joined as necessary parties.
Where the interests of groups of employees diverge, the court rea-
soned, the union cannot be an adequate representative of both.
Whether a union can adequately represent the interests of
absent parties in title VII litigation was also considered in English
v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad."' There, the Fifth Circuit
109 Id. 719 n.8. Accord, United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 52 F.R.D. 276,
280 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
A line of cases arising from alleged race discrimination by the Teamsters
union establishes a court's duty to ask whether the existing parties will protect the
interests of all those with an interest in a case. In United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C.,
Inc., 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds sub nor. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the international
union argued that union locals should be considered indispensable parties to the
litigation, because collective bargaining agreements which the locals had negotiated
were in question and because seniority rights arising out of those locally negotiated
contracts gave individual union members an interest in the case which only the local
unions could adequately represent. The court first concluded that the Teamster
locals were necessary parties under rule 19(b) and should be joined if feasible.
Because joinder was not feasible, however, the court then considered whether the
locals were indispensable parties whose absence would compel dismissal under
rule 19(b). Concluding that the international union could adequately represent
the interests of the local unions and the employees whose seniority rights were in
question, the court held that dismissal was unnecessary. Id. 310-11. Accord,
United States v. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., 564 F.2d 179, 186 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 525 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 519 (M.D.N.C.
1972).
1o51 F.R.D. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
111465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972).
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affirmed the lower court's ruling that white employees were neces-
sary parties in a title VII action by minority employees. The court
first declined to adopt an absolute rule that "in all circumstances
in which the implementation of a remedy may conceivably affect
the employment interests of white union members the District
Court must find that the union alone does not adequately
represent its white membership." 112 It then considered cir-
cumstances in which a union cannot adequately represent both
minority and majority employees because a requested remedy might
set up irreconciliable differences between those employees and con-
cluded that even then rule 19 does not require joinder in every
case. Citing school desegregation cases in which the interests of
white students in attending neighborhood schools were not repre-
sented, the court stated that a union's representation of its member-
ship is, no different in principle than a school board's representa-
tion of its community. In both situations, defendants are asked
to effect remedies "inimical to the traditional advantages of white
persons having a vested interest in the status quo." .13 Because
elimination of discrimination in employment often involves a more
detailed and subjective accommodation of competing interests, how-
ever, a court may be justified in concluding that representation of
adversely affected employees is "insurance that the ultimate goal of
terminating discrimination is accomplished in the most equitable
and least disruptive manner possible." 114
Although rule 19 says nothing about adequacy of representa-
tion by existent parties, the English court nonetheless did consider
the manner in which a court evaluates adequacy of representation
when deciding a rule 19 motion. This case therefore suggests a
way to distinguish earlier cases holding that adversely affected em-
ployees in title VII cases are not necessary or indispensable
parties.1 5 Where employers and unions have a financial interest in
showing that past discrimination did not exist, and the existence or
lack of existence of past discrimination is a key issue in an affirma-
tive action challenge, minority and women employees arguably are
necessary parties even though white and male employees would not
be necessary parties if the case were a more traditional discrimina-
tion complaint. In affirmative action challenges brought by whites
or males, minority and women workers have an interest in a court
112 Id. 46 (emphasis in original).
i's Id. 47.
14 Id.
115 See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
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finding of past discrimination, because that finding may be essential
to their future employment. That interest is not shared by any
existent party. In more traditional title VII actions brought by
minorities or women, on the other hand, the absent white and male
employees have an interest in a court finding of no past discrimina-
tion, but that interest is shared and represented by the employer
and the union.1 6
CONCLUSION
United Steelworkers v. Weber" 7 demonstrates how the dis-
torted adversarial posture of title VII affirmative action challenges
operates to exclude relevant evidence of discrimination from con-
sideration by the courts. Because neither the challengers nor the
defendant employers and unions have any incentive to present evi-
dence of discrimination, courts are frequently forced to decide
affirmative action challenges without knowledge of critical facts.
This Comment has proposed that courts remedy the situation by
using their procedural and equitable powers to compel the joinder
of minority and women beneficiaries of challenged affirmative
action plans.
It must be remembered, however, that failure to join necessary
or indispensable parties is ordinarily a defense raised by defend-
ants. In affirmative action challenges, defendant employers and
unions have no greater interest in joining minority employees who
may prove past discrimination than they have in proving the ex-
istence of past discrimination themselves. Without clear and well-
known case law to compel courts to order joinder of absent
minority and women employees in affirmative action challenges,
that joinder is unlikely to occur. Civil rights groups are not likely
to have the resources to seek intervention or raise joinder issues in
many affirmative action challenges occurring around the country,
and individual minority and women employees are probably in-
capable of asserting these issues on their own. Courts should
therefore recognize the distortion inherent in affirmative action
challenges and the necessity of joining affirmative action benefici-
aries in such challenges to ensure presentation of all relevant
evidence.
116 Nonminority employees do, however, have an interest in the remedy applied
by a court where past discrimination is found to have existed. On that issue, those
employees should be joined in some traditional title VII cases.
117443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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